Publications:
College Choice Allocation Mechanisms:Structural Estimates and Counterfactuals
(With Thierry Magnac and Jose-Raimundo Carvalho, forthcoming in Quantitative Economics)
We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students' expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and re-distributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.
(With Thierry Magnac and Jose-Raimundo Carvalho, forthcoming in Quantitative Economics)
We evaluate a simple allocation mechanism of students to majors at college entry that was commonly used in universities in Brazil in the 1990s and 2000s. Students first chose a single major and then took exams that select them in or out of the chosen major. The literature analyzing student placement, points out that this decentralized mechanism is not stable and is not strategy-proof. This means that some pairs of major & students can be made better off and that students tend to disguise their preferences using such a mechanism. We build up a model of performance and school choices in which expectations are carefully specified and we estimate it using cross-section data reporting choices between two medical schools and grade performances at the entry exams. Given those estimates, we evaluate changes in selection and students' expected utilities when other mechanisms are implemented. Results highlight the importance of strategic motives and re-distributive effects of changes of the allocation mechanisms.
Working Papers:
Endogenous Stock Market Participation: Risk Preference and Participation Cost
(under review; available as IWH Discussion Papers , No. 11, 2015)
This paper revisits the limited stock market participation puzzle and treats non-participation as an endogenous self-censoring. I employ a censored fractional response model to estimate both participation costs and risk preferences in a reduced form framework using European survey data. I show that all households face non-negligible participation costs, and the non-participants have significantly higher risk aversion than the participants. The new estimation corrects the sample selection bias in estimating risk preference with only participants and suggests an average relative risk aversion around 8.3 and an average participation cost of approximately EUR 80 for European households.
(under review; available as IWH Discussion Papers , No. 11, 2015)
This paper revisits the limited stock market participation puzzle and treats non-participation as an endogenous self-censoring. I employ a censored fractional response model to estimate both participation costs and risk preferences in a reduced form framework using European survey data. I show that all households face non-negligible participation costs, and the non-participants have significantly higher risk aversion than the participants. The new estimation corrects the sample selection bias in estimating risk preference with only participants and suggests an average relative risk aversion around 8.3 and an average participation cost of approximately EUR 80 for European households.
Housing Consumption and Macroprudential Policies in Europe: An Ex Ante Evaluation
(With Antonios Mavropolous; available as IWH Discussion Papers, No. 17, 2018)
In this paper, we use the panel of the first two waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey by the European Central Bank to study housing demand of European households and evaluate potential housing market regulations in the post-crisis era. We provide a comprehensive account of the housing decisions of European households between 2010 and 2014, and structurally estimate the housing preference of a simple life-cycle housing choice model. We then evaluate the effect of a tighter LTV/LTI regulation via counter-factual simulations. We find that those regulations limit homeownership and wealth accumulation, reduces housing consumption but may be welfare improving for the young households.
(With Antonios Mavropolous; available as IWH Discussion Papers, No. 17, 2018)
In this paper, we use the panel of the first two waves of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey by the European Central Bank to study housing demand of European households and evaluate potential housing market regulations in the post-crisis era. We provide a comprehensive account of the housing decisions of European households between 2010 and 2014, and structurally estimate the housing preference of a simple life-cycle housing choice model. We then evaluate the effect of a tighter LTV/LTI regulation via counter-factual simulations. We find that those regulations limit homeownership and wealth accumulation, reduces housing consumption but may be welfare improving for the young households.
Housing Yields [available upon request]
(With Stefano Colonnello and Roberto Marfè)
This paper investigates cross-sectional heterogeneity in residential property prices using rental and sale listings from a large German internet real estate. By matching properties for sale and for rent, we develop a novel price-to-rent ratio measure at the micro-level, with which we examine the determinants of regional variation in the first two moments of the ratio. The ratio strongly co-moves with local demographics, housing supply rigidities, and housing market liquidity. Correlation patterns are broadly in line with a Gordon framework, where differences in the price-to-rent ratio stem from heterogeneous expected discount and rent growth rates.
(With Stefano Colonnello and Roberto Marfè)
This paper investigates cross-sectional heterogeneity in residential property prices using rental and sale listings from a large German internet real estate. By matching properties for sale and for rent, we develop a novel price-to-rent ratio measure at the micro-level, with which we examine the determinants of regional variation in the first two moments of the ratio. The ratio strongly co-moves with local demographics, housing supply rigidities, and housing market liquidity. Correlation patterns are broadly in line with a Gordon framework, where differences in the price-to-rent ratio stem from heterogeneous expected discount and rent growth rates.
The Liquidity Premium of Safe Assets: The Role of Government Debt Supply
(Under review; available as IWH Discussion Papers, NO. 11, 2017)
This paper studies the impact of government debt supply on the liquidity premium, as measured by the yield spread between public and private safe assets. I test, at a quarterly frequency, how the liquidity premium of Treasury bills against i) Aaa-rated corporate bonds and ii) commercial paper responds to government debt supply changes. The response is significant in each case – even after controlling for the opportunity cost of money – but heterogeneous: negative for Aaa-rated corporate bonds and positive for commercial paper. This points to different degrees of substitutability with government debt across apparently similar private safe assets.
(Under review; available as IWH Discussion Papers, NO. 11, 2017)
This paper studies the impact of government debt supply on the liquidity premium, as measured by the yield spread between public and private safe assets. I test, at a quarterly frequency, how the liquidity premium of Treasury bills against i) Aaa-rated corporate bonds and ii) commercial paper responds to government debt supply changes. The response is significant in each case – even after controlling for the opportunity cost of money – but heterogeneous: negative for Aaa-rated corporate bonds and positive for commercial paper. This points to different degrees of substitutability with government debt across apparently similar private safe assets.
Research in Progress:
Credit Surface of Mortgage Loans: Lenders' Belief of Housing Markets
Action speaks louder than words. This paper uses the details of the abundant mortgage contracts that have been reported in the last two decades to unveil the true belief of the lenders revealed by their mortgage origination. Further, we compare to their ex ante belief at the mortgage origination with the ex post realization of the housing markets to see whether the lenders are doing a good job in forming realistic expectation about the housing market.
Action speaks louder than words. This paper uses the details of the abundant mortgage contracts that have been reported in the last two decades to unveil the true belief of the lenders revealed by their mortgage origination. Further, we compare to their ex ante belief at the mortgage origination with the ex post realization of the housing markets to see whether the lenders are doing a good job in forming realistic expectation about the housing market.
The Delivery Risk in Public Procurement of Long-term Projects
(With Sinem Hidir)
We study competitive public procurement of long-term projects, whose delivery is not certain either in completion time nor quality. We show that if public procurement ignores the delivery risk of long term projects in auctions, they create incentive for private bidders to bid lower than their optimal risk-cost trade off to win the project and then shirk in the effort of delivering the projects. The costly foreclosure of public-private partnership is likely to force the public authority into bailing out the shirking and inefficient private partner, which leads to big loss of public fund. We propose that delaying pay out for the projects is efficiency improving and prevents partly the adverse selection and mitigates the moral hazard problem. We plan to test our theory using the Italian public procurement record data and UK national archive data on public procurement.
(With Sinem Hidir)
We study competitive public procurement of long-term projects, whose delivery is not certain either in completion time nor quality. We show that if public procurement ignores the delivery risk of long term projects in auctions, they create incentive for private bidders to bid lower than their optimal risk-cost trade off to win the project and then shirk in the effort of delivering the projects. The costly foreclosure of public-private partnership is likely to force the public authority into bailing out the shirking and inefficient private partner, which leads to big loss of public fund. We propose that delaying pay out for the projects is efficiency improving and prevents partly the adverse selection and mitigates the moral hazard problem. We plan to test our theory using the Italian public procurement record data and UK national archive data on public procurement.
How Much Is Firm-Specific Human Capital Worth? Evidence from CEO Turnovers
(With Stefano Colonnello)
Rising importance of human capital poses challenges to the corporation as we know it and the CEO is the critical decision-maker of a corporation. Meanwhile, Employees' human capital is becoming less specific to their current employer (Zingales, 2000 JF). Do firm-specific skills make a better CEO? We use the choice between internal and external hires as a laboratory to structurally estimate the value of CEO firm-specific human capital. We follow the dynamic simplified version of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998 AER) and build on the model of Taylor (2010 JF). We introduce the choice between internal and external CEO candidates and exploit both forced and voluntary CEO turnovers to quantify the board's perception of firm-specific human capital distinguishing between inside and outside successions.
(With Stefano Colonnello)
Rising importance of human capital poses challenges to the corporation as we know it and the CEO is the critical decision-maker of a corporation. Meanwhile, Employees' human capital is becoming less specific to their current employer (Zingales, 2000 JF). Do firm-specific skills make a better CEO? We use the choice between internal and external hires as a laboratory to structurally estimate the value of CEO firm-specific human capital. We follow the dynamic simplified version of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998 AER) and build on the model of Taylor (2010 JF). We introduce the choice between internal and external CEO candidates and exploit both forced and voluntary CEO turnovers to quantify the board's perception of firm-specific human capital distinguishing between inside and outside successions.
The Effect of Wealth Fluctuation on Asset Holding: Micro-Evidence from Dutch Household Survey
(Under major revision, available upon request)
This paper uses the DNB Household Survey from Netherlands to investigate household portfolio adjustment in response to financial wealth fluctuation. I study both the intensive and extensive margin of the portfolio adjustment. I use the habit formation model to test whether household risky share adjusts when liquid financial wealth changes. The results show that changes in household risky asset holding has negative correlation with the changes in financial wealth, which rejects the decreasing relative risk aversion prediction of habit formation model. Meanwhile increasing relative risk aversion is also rejected when the sampling periods extend to 20 years. Constant relative risk aversion seems to best describe the risk preference of Dutch households.
(Under major revision, available upon request)
This paper uses the DNB Household Survey from Netherlands to investigate household portfolio adjustment in response to financial wealth fluctuation. I study both the intensive and extensive margin of the portfolio adjustment. I use the habit formation model to test whether household risky share adjusts when liquid financial wealth changes. The results show that changes in household risky asset holding has negative correlation with the changes in financial wealth, which rejects the decreasing relative risk aversion prediction of habit formation model. Meanwhile increasing relative risk aversion is also rejected when the sampling periods extend to 20 years. Constant relative risk aversion seems to best describe the risk preference of Dutch households.
Home vs. House: Non-self-occupied residential real estate investment and local housing market dynamics
